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1

Statement Showing the Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court:
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that "The Supreme Court by rule shall
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law."
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review:
Issue One: Whether the district court erred in staying an attorney's suspension
for intentionally engaging in professional misconduct involving dishonesty, and instead
imposing a period of probation.

The standard of review for sanctions imposed for

professional misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the
Utah Supreme Court may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate
level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah
1997). This issue was preserved through oral argument during the sanctions hearing.
(R. 189 at 90-91; 100-101)
Issue Two: Whether the district court erred in giving undue weight to mitigating
factors such as restitution, remorse, and candor to the court. The standard of review for
sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a
correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court may make an independent
judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In
re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue was preserved through oral argument
during the sanctions hearing. (R. 189 at 92-101)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules
Rule 2. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Rule 3. Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.
Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
Rule 6. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case.
The Course of Proceedings: The case originated in a disciplinary action against
Steven Crawley.

(R. 1-14)

The matter came before the trial court in a combined

adjudication and sanctions hearing on November 7, 2005. (R. 154). The case was
transferred to Judge Lindberg. Pursuant to a motion from the Office of Professional
Conduct ("OPC"), the trial court entered Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order of Discipline. (R. 154-165) This appeal ensued. (R. 179-180) By Order of
this Court on July 13, 2006, this appeal was consolidated with In re Henderson.
Disposition in the Trial Court: Crawley was suspended for a period of one year,
but the suspension was stayed and Crawley was placed on probation for a period of
eighteen months subject to certain conditions. (R. 162-164).

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
Crawley was a shareholder of the law firm Babcock, Bostwick, Scott, Crawley
and Price ("the firm"). (R. 155) One of the firm's clients was Interwest Construction.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. 155)
Crawley represented Interwest Construction in two matters relevant to this caseCase One, denominated Pettit Distribution Centers v. Interwest Construction ("the Pettit
Distribution matter"), and Case Two, denominated Toothman-Orton Engineering v.
Interwest Construction ("the Toothman-Orton matter"). (R. 155)
The Pettit Distribution matter involved a primary claim against Interwest
Construction, and Interwest Construction's three third-party claims against other
entities. (R. 156) Each of these matters would have been enhanced by obtaining an
expert report or affidavit, but Crawley failed to obtain either one. (R. 156)
In the Fall of 2001 in the Pettit Distribution matter, Interwest Construction lost
some of its third-party claims for lack of any supporting evidence, including an expert
report, and the court assessed attorneys' fees against Interwest Construction in two of
the third-party claims. (R. 156) Crawley failed to inform Interwest Construction that its
third-party claims were dismissed, and that attorneys' fees had been assessed against
it. (R. 156) Also in the Pettit Distribution matter, the court granted partial summary
judgment against Interwest Construction in March 2002, and the lack of an expert report
was part of the reason. (R. 156)
Crawley misrepresented the status of the Pettit Distribution matter to Interwest
Construction. (R. 156) Crawley also misrepresented the status of the Pettit Distribution
matter to the firm. (R. 156)
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The Toothman-Orton matter involved an action against Interwest Construction
for breach of contract.

(R. 156)

Interwest Construction counterclaimed against

Toothman-Orton for breach of contract and negligence. (R. 157)
Interwest Construction's defense against the primary claim and its prosecution of
the negligence counterclaim against Toothman-Orton depended upon obtaining an
expert report or affidavit. (R. 157)
On May 2, 2001, the District Court entered summary judgment against Interwest
Construction on its negligence cross-claim because Interwest Construction failed to
present an expert affidavit showing Toothman-Orton's cross-claim. The Court noted
that its "review of the undisputed facts giving rise to the alleged malpractice in this case
demonstrates that the matter is not of the kind within the ordinary knowledge and
experience of laymen.... Interwest was therefore required to present an expert affidavit
to show any negligence by Toothman-Orton. ... Because it failed to do so, summary
judgment will be granted in favor of Toothman-Orton on Interwest's negligence crossclaim." (R. 157) Crawley informed Interwest Construction that its counterclaim was
dismissed for reasons other than the actual reason. (R. 157)
In September 2001, an Amended Judgment was entered for Toothman-Orton
against Interwest Construction in the amount of $17,007.31. (R. 157)
Interwest Construction decided to pursue an appeal.

(R. 157)

Crawley

informed Interwest Construction that the firm would appeal the judgment, and in fact
had filed an appeal on its behalf in the Toothman-Orton matter. (R. 157) Crawley did
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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not file an appeal on behalf of Interwest Construction in the Toothman-Orton matter.
(R. 158)
At the time relevant to this proceeding, Crawley was responsible for the firm's
business affairs and financial management, including renewing its professional
negligence insurance coverage through its insurance company. (R. 158)
In November 2001, Crawley filled out a renewal application and checked the box
marked "No" in response to the following question: "At this time, does any applicant
know of any act, omission, or circumstance that could reasonably give rise to a
professional liability claim against any of the following: the firm, any past or present
attorneys in the firm, or any predecessor firm." (R. 158)
The application form asserted "The above statements are true and the Applicant
has not misstated, omitted, or suppressed any material fact(s).

It is understood and

agreed that this Renewal/Anniversary Application and any previously completed
Renewal/Anniversary Application(s) and/or Application(s) shall be the basis of the
contract with the Company and that this Renewal Anniversary Application, previously
completed Renewal/Anniversary Application(s) shall be incorporated into that contract."
(R. 158) Crawley signed the application as the "Authorized Principal or Applicant." (R.
158)
Crawley should have been aware that his acts and omissions in representing
Interwest Construction in the Pettit Distribution matter and the Toothman-Orton matter
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could reasonably give rise to a professional liability claim against the firm and/or against
Crawley, but did not disclose this. (R. 159)
Based upon the foregoing facts, the District Court in the disciplinary matter
against Crawley concluded that he violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.2(a) (Scope
of Representation), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) (Communication), Rule 8.4(c)
(Misconduct), and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (R.
159) It also found that suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction after taking
into consideration the four factors listed under Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions. (R. 159)
The court found the following aggravating factors: multiples offenses; the
multiple offenses involved elements of intentional dishonesty, either in the form of
affirmative misrepresentations, or omissions. (R. 159) Additionally, the court found "a
third aggravating circumstance is probably Mr. Crawley's substantial experience." (R.
159)
The court also found the following mitigating factors:

Crawley had no other

discipline for twenty-eight years; he was suffering from physical, personal, and
emotional problems; restitution has been made, albeit after the fact and not on his own
initiative; he enjoys a good character reputation in the community by those who he is in
a position to know; he has displayed substantial remorse. (R. 159-160)
The Court found two additional factors: Crawley's candor to the court. (R. 160)
The court stated that it "thinks he has been absolutely candid and has not done
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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anything to evade responsibility." (R. 160) Additionally, Crawley suffered a substantial
loss of value in the firm, which the court understood to equate closely to restitution.
The court also alluded to "the question of the imposition of other penalties and
sanctions." (R. 160)
Based on its findings of fact, the court made the following conclusions of law:
Crawley violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation), Rule
1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) (Communication), Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct), and Rule 8.4(a)
(Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. 160) Taking into consideration
the four factors listed under Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction. (R. 160) The court concluded,
however, that the suspension should be stayed and Crawley placed on probation, with
conditions, for a period of eighteen months.

(R. 161)

This became the Order of

Discipline. (R. 162-164)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the OPC's view, probation is not an appropriate sanction when an attorney
knowingly, or knowingly and intentionally, engaged in professional misconduct involving
dishonesty, particularly when there were significant aggravating factors including multiple
offenses and dishonest motives.

Probation is a sanction that should be reserved for

professional misconduct that lends itself to correction, with a respondent willing to
cooperate, and not employed for conduct giving rise to questions about the attorney's
fundamental integrity.
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The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") identify and define
probation as a sanction for professional misconduct, but do not provide guidance
concerning when probation may or should be imposed. Compare Rule 2, Standards, with
Rule 4, Standards. The OPC considers probation a useful tool for correcting practice
errors that arise from ignorance or lack of diligence or communication. Conversely, the
OPC views probation unsuitable as a sanction for conduct involving knowing or intentional
dishonesty with clients or courts.

Consistent with this approach, the OPC last year

determined not to appeal a District Court decision imposing probation in a setting
involving negligence.
Recently, however, two District Court decisions have imposed or permitted
probation for severe breaches of the attorneys' duties of honesty in various aspects of
their practices. Although they differ in their particulars, each of the cases involved the
respondent's knowing and intentional dishonesty to clients, third-parties, or to a tribunal.
Because of its serious concerns about fairness to respondents and the desirability of
promoting consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for similar offenses, as
well as its concerns about protecting the public and the administration of justice, the OPC
seeks review of the District Court decision in this case and in In re Henderson, which has
been consolidated herewith.

The OPC asks the Court to articulate criteria for the

imposition of probations, thereby providing guidance to the OPC and the District Courts,
and urges some particular standards for the Court's consideration. Finally, if the Court
concludes that the District Court erred in placing Crawley on probation, it requests that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court reverse that portion of the Order, and require Crawley to serve a one-year
suspension.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT'S GUIDANCE IS NEEDED CONCERNING CRITERIA FOR
IMPOSING PROBATIONS
A.

Appropriate Sanctions Are the Linchpins of an Effective Attorney
Discipline System, and Probation Has Its Place

An effective attorney discipline system depends upon appropriate and consistently
applied sanctions for professional misconduct.

The American Bar Association's Joint

Committee on Professional Sanctions stated it this way:
For lawyer discipline to be truly effective, sanctions must be based on
clearly developed standards. Inappropriate sanctions can undermine the
goals of lawyer discipline: sanctions which are too lenient fail to adequately
deter misconduct and thus lower public confidence in the profession;
sanctions which are too onerous may impair confidence in the system and
deter lawyers from reporting ethical violations on the part of other lawyers.
Inconsistent sanctions, either within a jurisdiction or among jurisdictions,
cast doubt on the efficiency and the basic fairness of all disciplinary
systems.
I.A., Preface, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (as amended Feb. 1992).
In Utah, the explicit purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings "is to ensure and
maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the
discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public and the
administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are
unable or unlikely to properly discharge their professional responsibilities."
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Rule 1(a),

Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"); see also Rule 1.1, Standards. To this
end, the Court adopted the Standards in 1993. See Compiler's Notes, Standards.
The Standards constitute a system "designed for use in imposing a sanction or
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct." Rule 1.3, Standards. They allow for
"flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct"
and are designed to promote consideration of all relevant factors and their appropriate
weight "in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline." Rule 1.3, Standards.
B.

The Standards Identify Probation as a Possible Sanction, But Provide
No Framework Concerning the Circumstances Under Which Probation
Is Appropriate

Rule 2 of the Standards is titled "Sanctions," and identifies discipline ranging from
the most to the least severe: disbarments, suspensions, reprimands, admonitions. See
Rule 2, Standards. The list of possible sanctions also includes resignation with discipline
pending, reciprocal discipline, and probation. See id. Each sanction is defined in the
rule, except for a short list of "Other sanctions and remedies" that includes restitution, the
assessment of costs, and the like. See id. As defined in Rule 2, "Probation is a sanction
that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public or
nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be
imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement." Rule 2.7, Standards.
Another rule in the Standards identifies the circumstances under which
disbarments, suspensions, reprimands, and admonitions are the appropriate presumptive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sanction.

See Rule 4, Standards. Rule 4 does not offer guidance concerning when

probation is an appropriate sanction, nor does it identify the circumstances under which
the sanctions of resignation with discipline pending and reciprocal discipline should be
imposed.

See id.

Procedures for seeking resignations with discipline pending and

reciprocal discipline are identified by specific rules in the RLDD, but the RLDD do not
address probation. See Rule 21 (Resignation with Discipline Pending), RLDD; Rule 22
(Reciprocal Discipline), RLDD. Thus, probation is the only sanction other than the list of
"Other sanctions and remedies," with no corresponding rule in the Standards identifying
when it is appropriate, or a rule in the RLDD identifying how it may be imposed.
C.

Although Probations or Their Equivalent Have Long Been Available in
Utah, The Question of When to Impose Them Appears to Be a Matter
of First Impression

Probations or their functional equivalent—stayed suspensions1—were not explicitly
identified among the sanctions noted in the body of rules that preceded today's RLDD
and Standards, but were available under the Supreme Court's inherent powers. See e.g.
Rules of Conduct and Discipline of the Utah State Bar, effective Nov. 1931 (Board of Bar
Commissioners could recommend reprimand, suspension, or disbarment, and Supreme
Court may exercise its inherent powers and "take any action agreeable to its judgment");
Rules V and VI, section 51, Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar,
1

Because a stayed suspension with conditions which, if not met, would trigger
reinstatement of the suspension, the OPC regards stayed suspensions as the
functional equivalent of probations. Courts and other tribunals do not appear to draw a
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effective Mar. 1940.
The OPC's review of Supreme Court opinions concerning lawyer discipline
revealed only a handful of cases in which probation was imposed or alluded to, but none
in which the Court discussed criteria that would make probation an appropriate option.
See e.g. In re Stoddard, 793 P.2d 373, 374-375, 377 (Utah 1990) (suspension stayed
and probation imposed for unintentional lack of diligence, but attorney violated conditions
and probation was revoked); In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 807, 809-810 (Utah 1990)
(attorney intentionally converted funds belonging to one client as payment for a debt
owed by another client; Court imposed six-month suspension, with five months stayed on
condition of payment of restitution and costs);2 In re Johnson, 830 P.2d 262, 262-263
(Utah 1992) (opinion alluded to attorney's probation by consent for what appear to have
been diligence and communication problems, but probation was revoked and this case
involved allegations of attorney practicing while suspended); In re Schwenke, 849 P.2d
573, 575 (Utah 1993) (opinion noted Court's acceptance of Bar recommendation to place
attorney on supervised probation for neglect of two matters; this case addressed
allegations concerning attorney's failure to comply with Court orders); In re Cassity, 875

more rigorous distinction between the two, and this Brief will not attempt to further
distinguish them.
2
Justice Stewart's opinion included a footnote stating that "a six-month suspension, even
if five months is stayed, is oppressive and unreasonable." Id. at 810 n.5. He added,
"Petitioner's conduct is not, in my view, that egregious." Id. He also cautioned that "it is
ill-advised to impose an over long period of suspension and then stay part of it to gain
leverage to compel an attorney to comply with other specific remedies. There are ample
means to compel compliance short of that." Id.
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P.2d 548, 548 (Utah 1994) (public reprimand and six months' probation for case
prosecuted as fee dispute).3
D.

The American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions Include Probation as a Potential Discipline But Do Not
Provide Criteria for Employing It

Utah's Standards are a substantially revised and streamlined version of the
American Bar Association Standards for
Standards").

Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA's

See Summary, Standards; In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 212.

Their

purposes "are nonetheless the same." Babilis, 951 P.2d at 212.
The ABA's Standards identify probation among the possible sanctions for
professional misconduct.

See Standard 2.7, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions, as amended Feb. 1992. The language of the ABA's probation provision
differs from the one employed in Utah, but its effect is similar: "Probation is a sanction
that allows a lawyer to practice under specified conditions. Probation can be imposed
alone or in conjunction with a reprimand, an admonition or immediately following a
suspension.

Probation can also be imposed as a condition of readmission or

reinstatement." Id. Notably, the ABA Standards do not include a suggested framework
for determining when probation is appropriate, nor do they offer guidance concerning
how it should be imposed.

This case is discussed in greater detail below.
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E.

Probation Is Available In Most Other States, But the Criteria for
Imposing It Vary

With some exceptions, the disciplinary rules of other states include probation
among the range of sanctions available for attorney misconduct. The OPC has compiled
summary information concerning these rules.

See Summary Chart of State Rules

Governing Probations and Stayed Suspensions, a copy of which is provided in the
Addendum. Conceptually, the states may be divided into those in which probation is not
provided for under the rules governing attorney discipline but the courts sometimes
impose it pursuant to their inherent authority; those in which probation is available under
conditions specified in the rules; and those, such as Utah, in which probation is explicitly
provided for, but no criteria are identified in the rules.
1.

Some Jurisdictions Have Rules Permitting Probation Only When
Specified Conditions Have Been Satisfied

Jurisdictions with rules permitting probation often identify conditions that must be
satisfied before probation can be imposed. These often include a proviso that probation
may only be imposed if there is little likelihood of harm to the public. See e.g. Rule 8(h),
Ala. R. of Disciplinary Pro. Others include a proviso that the conditions of probation must
be adequately supervised. See e.g. Section 17E(7), Ark. Sup. Ct. Pro. of Regulating
Conduct of Attorneys at Law.
Even where probation is permitted under certain conditions, the rules in other
jurisdictions usually are silent concerning the underlying misconduct and mental state for
which probation may be imposed. The exception is that a handful of rules in other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jurisdictions expressly limit probations to conduct that would not warrant disbarment. See
e.g. Rule 251.7, Colo. R. Civ. Pro. As far as the OPC can tell, Texas is the only state with
more finely calibrated criteria related to the misconduct itself. See Rule 15.11, Texas R.
of Disciplinary Pro. (probation cannot be used if respondent received public reprimand or
fully probated suspension in last five years for same rule violations, or two fully probated
suspensions in last five years, or received two public reprimands in last five years for
conflict of interest, theft, or failure to return clearly unearned fee).
2.

Reported Cases From Other Jurisdictions Sometimes Offer a
Useful Perspective on Probation as a Disciplinary Sanction

The OPC's search for reported cases involving probation as a disciplinary sanction
revealed numerous cases in which probation was employed without comment from the
court concerning the underlying misconduct and attorney's mental state that might
warrant such a sanction. Several cases were more helpful in articulating the courts'
reasoning, however, and these are summarized here.
In its first such decision, In re Jantz, the Supreme Court of Kansas4 considered
whether to stay the suspension of an attorney who converted client funds and lied to a
judge about it. See In re Jantz, 763 P.2d 626, 772-773 (Kan. 1988) (noting that the
court had "not used probation nor have we 'suspended' the execution of such
suspension."). Pursuant to the Kansas Supreme Court Rules Relating to Discipline of
Attorneys, which provide for disbarment, suspension, censure, or informal admonition,

4

Kansas is a jurisdiction in which probation is not explicitly provided by rule.
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and "[a]ny other form of discipline or conditions separate from or connected to any type
of discipline stated above, . . . which the Supreme Court deems appropriate,"5 the
Kansas Supreme Court adopted the hearing panel's recommendation. See id. at 775776. The court emphasized, however, that the case was "unique" because of the many
mitigating circumstances,6 and noted that it had "rarely failed to disbar or suspend any
attorney whose professional misconduct parallels that of the respondent." Id. at 775.
The unique circumstances were these:
The conduct complained of here took place within a very short period of
time; there were no complaints against respondent prior to these
incidents.
These took place when respondent was under severe
emotional distress, caused by the terminal illness of his father and his own
financial problems. Mr. Jantz admitted his misconduct to the judge
promptly. He has admitted the misconduct to his client and to the bar
where he practices. He made prompt restitution of the funds, which were
not at that time due the client but were paid by him into the hands of the
clerk of the district court, to await further order of the court. By the time
the disciplinary proceedings were underway, Jantz had already made
restitution, had commenced professional counseling (which is continuing),
and had prepared a plan for retirement of his debts and financial
obligations. We were told at the time of oral argument that he has made a
substantial reduction of his obligations since the panel hearing in March of
this year. His practice is growing, indicating that he is accepted by the
members of the bench and bar as well as the residents of the community
where he resides and practices.

Since then, the Kansas Supreme Court has rejected other requests for
probation, noting that "unique" circumstances are those "from which it reasonably could

5
6

Rule 203(a)(5), Kan. Sup. Ct. R. Relating to Discipline of Attorneys.
Apparently there were no aggravating factors, either.
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be inferred that the attorney's misconduct was a one-time response to adversity and
that it would be highly unlikely that he would repeat his mistake."

See e.g. In re

Scimeca, 962 P.2d 1080, 1090 (Kan 1998) (indefinitely suspended respondent, among
other things, for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and for
misconduct in dealing with clients, notwithstanding his contention that he suffers from
depression and is treating it, has filed personal and business bankruptcies, his son
suffers from a head injury, he apologized to the judge, and the incident involving the
judge was isolated).
In New Hampshire,7 the Supreme Court considered probation for an attorney's
trust account violations that involved among other things, commingling and failures to
maintain proper trust account records. See In re Morgan's Case, 727 A.2d 985, 987
(N.H. 1999). Although the attorney's "apparent ignorance of the rules cannot justify
their violation," the court concluded that the mitigating factors included self-reporting,
remedial efforts, stipulation to the facts, a lack of prior discipline, and absence of harm,
warranted a conditionally delayed suspension. Id. The court observed: "It is significant
that the respondent's actions were not motivated by dishonesty, for attorney misconduct
involving dishonesty reflects most negatively on the legal profession and will not be
tolerated." Id. (emphasis added).

7

New Hampshire is a jurisdiction without an explicit rule providing for probation.
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In Oregon, the Supreme Court rejected probation for an attorney's intentional
dishonesty with a client, noting that a condition of probation is only appropriate when
there is a correlation between it and the ethical violation. See e.g. In re Butler, 921 P.2d
401, 404 (Ore. 1996).

It concluded that "a lengthy suspension will provide greater

protection to the public." Id. More recently, the Supreme Court of Oregon "advise[d] the
Bar that we do not favor probationary terms unless they are the result of stipulation.
When a lawyer's misconduct is sufficiently serious to warrant a lengthy probationary
period, the uncertainties of the monitoring process lead us to prefer, when appropriate,
imposition of a sanction involving a concrete period of time." In re Obert, 89 P.3d 1173,
1181 (Ore. 2004).
The Supreme Court of Minnesota9 may grant probation, but "only [in] the most
extreme, extenuating circumstances," such as physical illness that precipitated a severe
depressive reaction which was causally related to the misconduct and had been
remedied; the misconduct had been rectified; there was no indication of fraud or deceit;
the attorney had made significant community contributions, and had no disciplinary
history. See In re McCallum, 289 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Minn. 1980).
Probation is imposed infrequently in the District of Columbia,10 and only when the
respondents conduct was influenced by a remediable disability. See e.g. In re Bradbury,
608 A.2d 1218, 1219 (D.C. 1992); see also In re Stow, 633 A.2d 782, (D.C. 1993)
8
9

Oregon has a rule providing for probation.
Minnesota's rules provide for probation.
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(probation appropriate for neglect of practice in light of respondent's acquiescence in
sanction)
F.

Probation Appears to Be Emerging As a Sanction Imposed Sua
Sponte By the District Court

Last year, the District Court imposed a one-year suspension upon an attorney
who violated various Rules of Professional Conduct in several client matters, but
granted the attorney leave to petition the court to stay all but three months on condition
that she undergo supervision for up to nine months.

See Ruling and Order Re:

Sanctions, In re Lang, Case Nos. 010910847 and 030908681, March 28, 2005, a copy
of which is supplied in the Addendum. The attorney had violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence),
1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(d)
(Misconduct), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct). See id. at 1. With the exception of her failure
to respond to the OPC, none of the violations were intentional; some violations were
knowing, others were merely negligent. See id. at 5-9. There were aggravating factors
in the form of dishonest and selfish motives as to some misconduct; a pattern of
misconduct; multiple offenses; obstruction of the disciplinary process; refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct; and substantial experience with
respect to some matters. See id. at 9-12. Mitigating factors were: absence of a prior
record (but this was accorded little weight); inexperience as to some of the matters; and
interim reform. See id. at 12-15. The court found that suspension was the presumptive

10

Minnesota's rules provide for probation.
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sanction, although it noted that disbarment might be justified and appropriate. See id.
at 15.
The District Court "wrestled with its options," in the face of "the recurring question
[of] just what sanction might give [the attorney] the best possible chance to make
fundamental changes that could substantially improve her prospects of practicing law
until retirement without being plagued by continuing allegations of professional
misconduct." Id. at 15. The court explained its reasons for permitting the lawyer to
petition for a stay:
The OPC argues for a suspension of at least six months and one
day, but the preferred sanction is a one year suspension. As already
indicated, this court does not believe that the presumption of suspension
is overcome in this case in any way that would justify the lesser sanctions
urged by [the attorney].
Accordingly, the sanction must include
suspension, but the court firmly believes that a suspension of six months,
or even one year, without a more proactive component, will do anything to
change [the attorney's] professional conduct in the long term. There must
be a term of actual suspension to bring home the seriousness of this
lawyer's misconduct, but the court determines that there must also be a
period of supervised practice to give [the attorney] a chance to see how
family law can and should be practiced at the highest levels of
professional responsibility, with due regard for clients, other counsel, and
the courts.
Id. at 15-16. Ultimately, the attorney successfully petitioned for the stay of suspension.
See Order Staying the Respondent's Suspension and Concerning the Respondent's
Reinstatement to the Practice of Law Upon Termination of the Period of Suspension, In
re Lang, Civil No. 010910847, a copy of which is included in the Addendum.
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Although it had urged a sanction other than probation, the OPC concluded the
District Court had not erred in imposing the suspension plus probation in the foregoing
case.

Indeed, the OPC has sometimes stipulated to proposals for a respondent's

probation when the misconduct originated from something that clearly could be
remedied and the OPC is also persuaded of the attorney's commitment to change and
to cooperate. For example, negligent conduct in violation of the rule requiring a lawyer
to "provide competent representation to a client;"11 negligent conduct in violation of the
rule requiring lawyers to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client;"12 negligent conduct in violation of the rule requiring a lawyer to keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter.13 In such circumstances, where it
appears that appropriate additional training or mentoring would eliminate the problems
without further injury to any client, probation is arguably the most effective means of
securing long-term protection of the public. Significantly, progress can be reported,
measured, and verified if necessary, thereby adequately insuring protection of the
public, the courts, and the profession.
G.

The OPC Urges the Court to Exercise Its Special Role in Governing the
Practice of Law By Providing the Guidance Requested

Pursuant to Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court "plays a special role in
governing the practice of law," which "includes overseeing the discipline of persons

11

Rule 1.1, R. Pro. Con.
Rule 1.3, R. Pro. Con.
13
Rule 1.4, R. Pro. Con.
12
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admitted to practice law." In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998). Trial court
findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but the Court "reserve[s] the
right to draw different inferences from the facts than those drawn by the trial court." Id.
Significantly, "[w]ith respect to the discipline actually imposed, our constitutional
responsibility requires [the Court] to make an independent determination as to its
correctness." Id. In one of the first cases brought under the new disciplinary scheme
inaugurated in 1993, the Court said, "Although we recognize as a general proposition the
district court's advantaged position in overall familiarity with the evidence and the context
of the case, on appeal we must treat the ultimate determination of discipline as our
responsibility." Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213.
The Court has exercised this role in the past by providing guidance concerning
how the Standards should be applied. For example, in the Ince case, the Court noted
that "Although the new Standards are intended to preserve a measure of flexibility in
assigning sanctions, the whole basis for their adoption was to avoid the uncertainty that
existed under the old rules.

Therefore, we offer the following guidance as to the

application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under rule 6 [of the Standards]."
In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998) (aggravating and mitigating factors must be
significant to warrant departing from presumptive level of discipline set forth in
Standards).
Justice Durham's concurring and dissenting opinion in another disciplinary matter,
In re Johnson, elaborated upon the Court's role in attorney misconduct matters:
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This court is charged by the Utah Constitution with the obligation to regulate
the practice of law. We have delegated the screening, fact-finding, and
initial judgment regarding discipline to the Utah State Bar and to the district
courts, but we retain the final authority to oversee the system. When the
prosecuting entity and the disciplined attorney accede to the
appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction imposed by the trial courts, or
at least fail to challenge it, we lend out constitutional authority to the finality
of the determination. Such trial court decisions, of course, create no
precedent for the disposition of other cases. Where a sanction is
challenged, however, this court undertakes a function that goes beyond the
review of an individual case. We arbitrate questions of proportionality, rules
of law, and guidelines for the imposition of sanctions that have general
application for the practice of law in Utah. Our decisions interpret the Rules
of Professional Conduct and develop the principles of application that will
guide lawyers, the Bar, and the trial courts.
In re Johnson, 2001 UT 110, TJ 21 (Durham, J . , concurring and dissenting). Justice
Durham also noted the trial courts' "more limited perspective on the disciplinary system"
and observed that "[i]t is not at all unexpected that a trial judge's best assessment of the
trend of developing law turns out to be 'wrong' in the sense that this court will reject it and
opt for a different interpretation or policy." Id. at U 23.
It is in this spirit that the OPC seeks review of the Crawley case and its companion
case, In re Henderson. The Court's decision here will have a significant bearing on future
disciplinary cases, as well as the cases in issue here.
II.

PROBATION SHOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE FOR MISCONDUCT THAT IS
AMENDABLE TO CORRECTION
A.

Probation Is an Appropriate Sanction for Some Misconduct

Consistent with the goal of protecting the public and the administration of justice,
probation is a means of ensuring that reform has occurred. Likewise, probation imposed
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in conjunction with other sanctions and remedies, such as a requirement that the lawyer
attend continuing education courses, or work under the supervision of another lawyer,14 is
a significant tool for ensuring and maintaining high standards of professional conduct.15
The factors for determining when to use probation are a more difficult question.
Rule 4 of Utah's Standards identifies the presumptive sanctions for certain types of
misconduct, but does not include probation as an appropriate presumptive sanction.
See Rule 4, Standards.

Accordingly, probation appears to be an appropriate final

sanction—that is, a sanction ultimately imposed upon consideration of the factors
identified in Rule 3 of the Standards, which include the duty violated, the lawyer's
mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct, and aggravating
and mitigating factors—but not a presumptive sanction.

See Rule 3.1, Standards.

Probation, then, is a legitimate ultimate solution, but when should it be imposed?
B.

The Factors Identified in Rule 3 of the Standards
Considered in Imposing a Sanction of Probation

Should Be

Although the Standards are brief, being comprised of just six rules, they are
nevertheless loaded with the criteria necessary for promoting a rational and thorough

14

Rule 2 of the Standards provides for the imposition of other sanctions and remedies,
including "a requirement that a lawyer attend continuing education courses." Rule 2.9,
Standards.
15
The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline has
observed that if probation is not available as a sanction for lawyers in need of supervision
but who could "perform useful services," the only choices are "suspension, which involves
an unnecessary deprivation of the lawyer's livelihood, or continuation of practice, which
involves a possible threat to the public." Louisiana State BarAss'n v. Longenecker, 532
So.2d 1143, 164 n.1 (La. 1989).
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consideration of all relevant factors.

Rule 3 is the rule that explicitly draws together

these factors:
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a
finding of lawyer misconduct:
(a) The duty violated;
(b) The lawyer's mental state;
(c) The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct;
and
(d) The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
Rule 3.1, Standards.

The sanctions of resignation with discipline pending and

reciprocal discipline are not governed by Rule 3 because the factors are inapplicable,
and they are addressed by explicit separate provisions of the RLDD. By contrast, the
factors identified in Rule 3 are readily applicable in probation settings, and probation is
not addressed by the RLDD. Accordingly, the Rule 3 factors should be considered in
imposing the sanction of probation, and these are discussed below.
Lawyers owe duties to clients, tribunals, the public, and the profession. These
are not set forth in the Standards, but are embedded in the Rules of Professional
Conduct. For example, duties to clients are inherent in the rules requiring an attorney
to provide competent, diligent representation and adequate communication. See e.g.
Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4, R. Pro. Con.

A lawyer has a duty to maintain the integrity of

the profession. See e.g. Rules 8.1 and 8.3, R. Pro. Con. Of particular significance for
this case, a lawyer also owes duties of honesty and candor to tribunals and opposing
counsel, as well as a duty of fairness to opposing parties. See e.g. Rules 8.4, 4.1, 4.4,
R. Pro. Con.
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As to the relevant mental states, these are identified and defined in the
Standards:
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result,
"Knowledge is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or
purpose to accomplish a particular result.
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the
situation.
Definitions, Standards.
Injury may be actual or potential, and its level can range from "serious" to "little or
no." See Definitions, Standards. Injury and potential injury includes harm to clients, the
public, the legal system, or the profession. See id.
The Standards set forth a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in Rule 6, and this Court has provided guidance concerning their
existence and the weight they should be accorded. See Rule 6, Standards; see also
e.g. In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998).
C.

In the OPC's View, Probation Is Not Appropriate When the
Respondent Has Intentionally or Knowingly Violated Duties of
Honesty and Candor

Employing the Rule 3 factors, the OPC has concluded that probation should not
be available as a sanction when the duty violated was the duty to deal honestly with
clients, tribunals, or third parties, and when the lawyer's mental state in committing the
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misconduct was knowing or intentional.

Further, probation is not appropriate when

certain aggravating factors are present, a point addressed later.
Any sanction should maintain respect for the profession and protect the public,
and should be sufficient to prevent recurrence of the misconduct and deter others from
engaging in similar misconduct. Moreover, the degree of discipline must correspond to
the gravity of the misconduct.

Collectively, the question is whether the discipline is

appropriate in light of the nature of the misconduct, the cumulative weight of the
disciplinary rule violations, the potential harm to the public, and the harm to the legal
profession itself.
With these considerations in mind, probations in disciplinary matters involving an
attorney's intentional or knowing dishonesty are inappropriate because the misconduct
reflects an absence of integrity that cannot be remedied with further training or
supervision. Moreover, a respondent's reform cannot be verified. Indeed, absent 24hour supervision, a supervising attorney cannot possible know if there have been
further misrepresentations or other lapses of integrity.
The OPC's position derives in part from the seriousness with which the Court
has treated discipline matters involving an attorney's lack of integrity in a variety of
settings. See e.g. In re Norton, 146 P.2d 899, 900-901 (Utah 1944) (attorney "charged
with an attempt to deceive this court" by intentionally misrepresenting that an exhibit
had been admitted in evidence; although attempt was unsuccessful, the Court imposed
one-year suspension); In re Bybee, 629 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1988) (attorney's lack of
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truthfulness and candor to a court warranted a suspension; such conduct, "if allowed
without proper restraint and punishment, would undermine our system of justice."); In re
Cassity, 875 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah 1994) (had Cassity's misrepresentation to a court
"been charged and prosecuted before the hearing as an independent act of professional
misconduct, disbarment or suspension may have been appropriate, but that was not the
case."). In his concurring opinion in Cassity, Chief Justice Zimmerman wrote,
Conduct such as Cassity's factual misrepresentation to the court
strikes at the heart of the legitimacy of the adversary system. The
importance of a lawyer's obligation of candor to the tribunal cannot be
overstated. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to be advocates for their
clients, not to be their co-conspirators. . . . It would ignore reality to
recognize that at times, cultural and economic pressures cause some
lawyers to forget the distinction. . . . But when such conduct comes to
light, I think it should be punished harshly to serve as continuing notice on
errant members of the profession that we will not tolerate it. Severe
punishment also assures the public that, despite the cynical teachings of
popular culture that lawyers are prostitutes in nice clothing fit only for
dinosaur food, in fact, lawyers are bound by rigid ethical standards which
are designed to preserve the integrity of the adversary system.
Cassity, 875 P.2d at 552 (citations omitted) (Zimmerman, J . , concurring).
D.

Probation Should Only Be Available When Certain
Factors Are Not Present

Aggravating

Additionally, even in cases not involving misconduct based upon an attorney's
intentional or knowing violation of duties of honesty, probation would not be appropriate
when aggravating factors suggest that the respondent is unlikely to cooperate with the
OPC and has not demonstrated the self-awareness that is a necessary component of a
true commitment to change.

In other words, an attorney whose misconduct was
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dishonestly motivated,

who denies responsibility,

who engages in deceptive

practices during the disciplinary proceeding,18 or who displays an uncooperative attitude
toward the proceedings,19 is an unlikely candidate for the rehabilitative possibilities
offered by probation.
III.

CRAWLEY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION GIVEN
THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES VIOLATED AND THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
A.

Crawley Intentionally Misled His Client, His Colleagues, and His
Firm's Insurance Carrier

Crawley repeatedly violated his duty of honesty to his client, his firm's insurance
carrier, and his colleagues at the firm. He misrepresented the status of one matter to
the client and to his firm; told the client that another matter was dismissed for reasons
other than the actual reason; told the client that a matter had been appealed, when it
had not; and in response to a direct question from his firm's insurance carrier, failed to
inform the carrier that his acts and omissions could give rise to a professional liability
claim.

His affirmative representations and omissions were intentionally dishonest.

These violations of Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving

Rule 6.2(b), Standards (dishonest motive is an aggravating circumstance).
Rule 6.2(f), Standards (refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of misconduct is an
aggravating circumstance).
18
Rule 6.2(f), Standards (submission of false statements or evidence, or other deceptive
practices during disciplinary process is an aggravating circumstance).
19
Rule 6.2(e), Standards (obstruction of disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing
to comply with rules or orders is an aggravating circumstance).
17
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dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," were failures of an attorney's most
fundamental duty to his client and to the profession. Moreover, as the aggravating
factors

demonstrate,

Crawley's

motive

was

dishonest

with

respect

to

the

misrepresentations and omissions, and there were multiple offenses.
B.

The Court Gave Undue Weight to Some of the Mitigating Factors

In the OPC's view, the Court Considered mitigating factors which either should
not have been considered, or which were entitled to little if any weight.

If these

informed its decision to place Crawley on probation, this was in error.
1. Crawley Made Restitution Only After the Fact and Not on His Own
Initiative
The District Court found and concluded as a mitigating circumstance that
"[restitution has been made, albeit after the fact and not on his own initiative." (R. 160)
Further, "Crawley has suffered what the Court accepts to be essentially a one hundred
and fifty thousand dollar loss of value in the firm. The Court understands this equates
very closely to the restitution element." (R. 160)
The OPC believes the court erred in assigning Crawley's restitution and financial
loss as a mitigating factor.

Restitution is entitled to little weight if it is made, as in this

matter, after a respondent's misconduct is discovered. See /nee, 957 P.2d at 1238. As
this Court has stated, "After an attorney's misconduct is discovered, restitution can be
characterized simply as the 'honesty of compulsion' and may be evidence only of the
lawyer's ability to raise the money or desire to avoid being disbarred rather than of a
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sincere desire to rectify the wrongdoing." Id.; see also Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, U 13
(repaying client, though the right thing to do, not accomplished in way that mitigated
misappropriation because attorney did it after forced to do so by threat of suit); Rule
6.4(a), Standards ("forced or compelled restitution" is neither aggravating nor
mitigating).
2.

The Fact That Crawley Did Not Deny Wrongdoing Does Not
Constitute Remorse Within the Meaning of the Standards

The District Court found and concluded that Crawley "has displayed substantial
remorse." The dialogue between the court and counsel on this point demonstrates,
however, that remorse was only evident at trial in the form of the absence of denial by
Crawley:
Ms. Toomey: With respect to remorse, there was no direct
testimony of this from Mr. Crawley himself. In any event, the Supreme
Court has said that it's entitled to negligible weight because anybody
would be remorseful at trial. The question is did he demonstrate it before
he got caught and there is no testimony of that. Did he tell anybody
before they found out from other sources? He didn't tell the colleagues
that he was apparently quite close to[.] [T]hey regarded him as a mentor,
so it may not have been appropriate in that context, but he didn't tell his
wife.
So I think that the evidence—there isn't any evidence of remorse.
The Court: I mean there clearly is perhaps not beforehand, but he
is remorseful now. I guess I would say to you that you'd be surprised at
the number of people that would take that stand in similar settings and not
express any remorse or any belief that they have ever done anything
wrong but they're just getting shanked. So, there is, I mean, there is
certainly no acknowledgment that what this is[,] ["Jit's just the system, you
know, I didn't do anything wrong.
I don't have any personal
responsibility^"] I guess that's my point is that's certainly present.
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Ms. Toomey: Correct.
The Court: There's no denial here of any wrongdoing whatsoever.
Ms. Toomey: No, no. That's correct.
(R. 189 at 99-100 (emphasis added))
This Court has indicated that "remorse at trial is irrelevant." Tanner, 960 P.2d at
403; Stubbs, 974 P.2d at 300. It has explained, "Naturally, anyone going through a trial
for [the respondent's] wrongdoing would feel remorse after getting caught. Instead, the
remorse question closely relates to acknowledgement of wrongful conduct: did [the
respondent] feel remorse about his behavior before getting caught, and was he
motivated by remorse to make amends?" Tanner, 960 P.2d at 403 (emphasis added).
Crawley did not deny wrongdoing, but his remorse was evident only after it became
clear that his misconduct had been discovered, and made amends "after the fact and
not on his own initiative."
3.

Crawley's Candor to the Court Is Not a Mitigating Factor

The Court found and concluded that Crawley "has been absolutely candid and
has not done anything to evade responsibility." This is not a mitigating factor within the
meaning of the Standards. Any witness testifying in court is under oath and expected
to be scrupulously honest.

As such, a respondent's candor cannot be a mitigating

factor; it is his duty.
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CONCLUSION
The ultimate responsibility for disciplinary cases lies with this Court, and in light of
its unique role in regulating the profession, the OPC asks it for guidance concerning the
underlying misconduct and the attorney's mental state for which probation is appropriate.
Such guidance will provide enormous assistance to the OPC, the District Court, and
future respondents, because it will promote consistency in sanctions for similar types of
misconduct.
If the OPC has correctly concluded that probation is inappropriate as a sanction for
misconduct involving an attorney's breach of the fundamental duty of honesty to clients
and others, the OPC asks the Court to adopt this as a bright-line test for determining the
availability of probation.
Additionally, if the Court concludes that the District Court erred in placing Crawley
on probation instead of imposing a period of actual suspension, the OPC requests that
the Court reverse that portion of the Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions and impose a
suspension upon him.
DATED: August

3t ^ T

, 2006.
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

ato A.
A Toomey
Tnnmow
Kate
Deputy Counsel
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Rules of Central Importance Cited in the Brief
Rule 2. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
2.1. Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer
upon a finding or acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in
professional misconduct.
2.2. Disbarment.
Disbarment terminates the individual's
status as a lawyer. A lawyer who has been disbarred may be
readmitted as provided in Rule 25 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability.
2.3. Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer
from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time.
Generally, suspension should be imposed for a specific period of
time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the
time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three
years.
(a) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less
may be reinstated as set forth in Rule 24 of the Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability.
(b) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six
months may be reinstated as set forth in Rule 25 of the Rules of
Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
2.4. Interim suspension.
Interim suspension is the
temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law. Interim
suspension may be imposed as set forth in Rules 18 and 19 of the
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
2.5. Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which
declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the
lawyer's right to practice.
2.6. Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which
declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the
lawyer's right to practice.
2.7. Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer
to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public
or nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other
sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of readmission or
reinstatement.
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2.8. Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with
discipline pending is a form of public discipline which allows a
respondent to resign from the practice of law while either an
informal or formal complaint is pending against the respondent.
Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in
Rule 21 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.
2.9. Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and
remedies which may be imposed include:
(a) restitution;
(b) assessment of costs;
(c) limitation upon practice;
(d) appointment of a receiver;
(e) a requirement that the lawyer take the bar examination or
professional responsibility examination; and
(f) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education
courses.
2.10. Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the
imposition of a disciplinary sanction on a lawyer who has been
disciplined in another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory
body having disciplinary jurisdiction.

Rule 3. Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
3.1. Generally.
The following factors should be considered in imposing a
sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct:
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer's mental state;
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
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Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
4.1. Generally.
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon
application of the factors set out in Standard 3.1, the following
sanctions are generally appropriate.
4.2. Disbarment.
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined
in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the
court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious
interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary
element of which includes intentional interference with the
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud,
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to
commit any of these offenses; or
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
4.3. Suspension.
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined
in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the
legal system, or causes interference or potential interference with a
legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the
elements listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
4.4. Reprimand.
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional
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Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal
system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in any other misconduct that involves
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
4.5. Admonition.
Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the
legal system or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a
party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or
(b) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise
identified in this Standard 4 that adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law.

Rule 6. Aggravation
Sanctions.

and Mitigation, Standards

for Imposing Lawyer

6.1. Generally.
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and
mitigating circumstances may be considered and weighed in
deciding what sanction to impose.
6.2. Aggravating circumstances.
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors
that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be
imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include:
(a) prior record of discipline;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the
misconduct involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary
authority;
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(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved; and
(k) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled
substances.
6.3. Mitigating circumstances.
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors
that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be
imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include:
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of the misconduct involved;
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary
authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative
attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) good character or reputation;
(h) physical disability;
(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance
abuse when:
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or
mental disability; and
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally
contributed to the misconduct; and
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained
period of successful rehabilitation; and
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence
of that misconduct is unlikely;
(j) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided
that the respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and
provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice
resulting from the delay;
(k) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental
disability or impairment;
(I) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(m) remorse; and
(n) remoteness of prior offenses.
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6.4. Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating.
The following circumstances should not be considered as
either aggravating or mitigating:
(a) forced or compelled restitution;
(b) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(c) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary
proceedings;
(d) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and
(e) failure of injured client to complain.
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Kate A. Toomey, #6446
Deputy Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone No. 801 531-9110
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline of:

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER OF DISCIPLINE

Steven Crawley, #00750
Civil No. 040905620
Judge Denise P. Lindberg

Respondent.

This matter came on for a combined Adjudication and Sanctions Hearing on Monday,
November 1, 2005. The Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") was represented by Kate A.
Toomey, Deputy Counsel. The Respondent, Steven Crawley, was present and represented by his
attorney, Gregory G. Skordas. The parties had previously stipulated that the matter could be tried
as a combination Adjudication and Sanctions Hearing. Additionally, the parties entered into
Stipulated Facts, which are adopted and incorporated herein, prior to the commencement of the
hearing.
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The Office of Professional of Conduct called one witness at the hearing: the Respondent,
Steven Crawley. The Respondent called the following witnesses: Darrel J. Bostwick, Attorneyat-Law; Charlene Crawley, wife of the Respondent; Steven Crawley, the Respondent; Jeffery
Price, Attorney-at-Law; and Dr. Lynn Johnson, PhD, a psychologist who treated the Respondent.
Additionally, the Respondent proffered the character testimony of attorney Randy Birch, and the
similar testimony of Stella Allen, director of Habitat for Humanity.
After hearing the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters the
following:
STIPULATED FACTS
1.

Steven Crawley is an attorney licensed in the State of Utah and a member of the

Utah State Bar.
2.

At the time relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Crawley was a shareholder of the law

firm Babcock, Bostwick, Scott, Crawley and Price ("the firm").
3.

One of the firm's clients was Interwest Construction.

4.

Crawley represented Interwest Construction in two matters relevant to this

Complaint - Case One, denominated Pettit Distribution Centers v. Interwest Construction, Case
No. 000902176, Third Judicial District Court ("the Pettit Distribution matter"), and Case Two,
denominated Toothman-Orton Engineering v. Interwest Construction, Case No. 1:99CV438,
United States District Court for the District of Idaho ("the Toothman-Orton matter").
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5.

The Pettit Distribution matter involved a primary claim against Interwest

Construction, and Interwest Construction's three third-party claims against Messerly Concrete,
Western States Waterproofing, and Chemrex.
6.

Interwest Construction's primary claim and the third-party claims in the Pettit

Distribution matter would have been enhanced by obtaining an expert report or affidavit.
7.

Crawley failed to obtain an expert report or affidavit for the Pettit Distribution

8.

In the Fall of 2001 in the Pettit Distribution matter, Interwest Construction lost

matter.

some of its third-party claims for lack of any supporting evidence, including an expert report.
9.

The District Court assessed attorneys' fees against Interwest Construction in two

third-party claims in the Pettit Distribution matter.
10.

Crawley failed to inform Interwest Construction that its third-party claims were

dismissed, and that attorneys' fees had been assessed against it in the Pettit Distribution matter.
11.

In the Pettit Distribution matter, the District Court granted partial summary

judgment against Interwest Construction in March 2002, and the lack of an expert report was part
of the reason.
12.

Crawley misrepresented the status of the Pettit Distribution matter to Interwest

Construction.
13.

Crawley misrepresented the status of the Pettit Distribution matter to the firm.

14.

The Toothman-Orton matter involved an action against Interwest Construction for

breach of contract.
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15.

Interwest Construction counterclaimed against Toothman-Orton for breach of

contract and negligence.
16.

Interwest Construction's defense against the primary claim and its prosecution of

the negligence counterclaim against Toothman-Orton depended upon obtaining an expert report
or affidavit.
17.

On May 2, 2001, the District Court entered summary judgment against Interwest

Construction on its negligence cross-claim because Interwest Construction failed to present an
expert affidavit showing Toothman-Orton's cross-claim. The Court noted that its "review of the
undisputed facts giving rise to the alleged malpractice in this case demonstrates that the matter is
not of the kind within the ordinary knowledge and experience of laymen.... Interwest was
therefore required to present an expert affidavit to show any negligence by Toothman-Orton. ...
Because it failed to do so, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Toothman-Orton on
Interwest's negligence cross-claim."
18.

Crawley informed Interwest Construction that its counterclaim was dismissed for

reasons other than the actual reason.
19.

In September 2001, an Amended Judgment was entered for Toothman-Orton

against Interwest Construction. The total amount of the judgment was $17,007.31.
20.

In the Toothman-Orton matter, Interwest Construction decided to pursue an

21.

Crawley informed Interwest Construction that the firm would appeal the

appeal.

judgment, and in fact had filed an appeal on its behalf in the Toothman-Orton matter.
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22.

Crawley did not file an appeal on behalf of Interwest Construction in the

Toothman-Orton matter.
23.

At the time relevant to this proceeding, Crawley was responsible for the film's

business affairs and financial management, including renewing its professional negligence
insurance coverage.
24.

The firm was insured through Medmarc Casualty Insurance Company.

25.

In November 2001, Crawley filled out an application captioned "ProMarc

Renewal Anniversary Application."
26.

Crawley checked the box marked "No" in response to the following question from

Medmarc Casualty Insurance Company: "At this time, does any applicant know of any act,
omission, or circumstance that could reasonable give rise to a professional liability claim against
any of the following: the firm, any past or present attorneys in the firm, or any predecessor firm."
27.

The application form asserted "The above statements are true and the Applicant

has not misstated, omitted, or suppressed any material fact(s). It is understood and agreed that
this Renewal/Anniversary Application and any previously completed Renewal/Anniversary
Application(s) and/or Application(s) shall be the basis of the contract with the Company and that
this Renewal Anniversary Application, previously completed Renewal/Anniversary
Application(s) shall be incorporated into that contract."
28.

Crawley signed the application as the "Authorized Principal or Applicant."
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29.

Crawley should have been aware that his acts and omissions in representing

Interwest Construction in the Pettit Distribution matter and the Toothman-Orton matter could
reasonably give rise to a professional liability claim against the firm and/or against Crawley.
30.

Crawley did not disclose to Medmarc Insurance Company that his acts and

omissions in representing Interwest Construction in the Pettit Distribution matter and the
Toothman-Orton matter could reasonably give rise to a professional liability claim against him or
the firm.
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
31.

Mr. Crawley violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of

Representation), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) (Communication), Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct),
and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
32.

Suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction after taking into consideration

the four factors listed under Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.
33.

The aggravating factors are:
a. Multiples offenses.
b. The multiple offenses involved elements of intentional dishonesty, either in
the form of affirmative misrepresentations, or omissions.
c. In addition, a third aggravating circumstance is probably Mr. Crawley's
substantial experience.

34.

The mitigating factors are:
a. The absence of any other discipline for twenty-eight years.
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b. Mr. Crawley was suffering from physical, personal, and emotional problems.
The Court understands this conflates two of the mitigating factors.
c. Restitution has been made, albeit after the fact and not on his own initiative.
d. Mr. Crawley enjoys a good character reputation in the community by those
who he is in a position to know.
e. Mr. Crawley has displayed substantial remorse.
35.

Two other factors that are not expressly listed are:
a. Mr. Crawley's candor to the court. The Court thinks he has been absolutely
candid and has not done anything to evade responsibility.
b. Mr. Crawley has suffered what the Court accepts to be essentially a one
hundred and fifty thousand dollar loss of value in the firm. The Court
understands this equates very closely to the restitution element.
c.

Then there is the question of the imposition of other penalties and sanctions.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
1.

Mr. Crawley violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of

Representation), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) (Communication), Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct),
and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
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2.

The Court concludes that suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction after

taking into consideration the four factors that are listed under Rule 3, Standards for hnposing
Lawyer Sanctions.
3.

There are several aggravating factors and several mitigating factors that apply in

this case in various degrees, as set forth above.
3.

The Court concludes that Mr. Crawley should be suspended for one year, but to

stay that suspension and place him on probation for a period of eighteen months with the
following conditions:
a.

Mr. Crawley's conduct should be subject to public disclosure in the
Discipline Comer that reflects the determinations that have been made,
and what the violations are.

b.

Mr. Crawley should not engage in any litigation during that period of time,
nor enter any appearance in court.

c.

Mr. Crawley should not advertise at all during that period of time as well.

d.

Mr. Crawley should donate twenty-five hours of pro bono time to clients,
or Bar-related community service, either through Tuesday Night Bar or
some other organization as mutually agreed-upon by counsel for the
parties.

e.

Mr. Crawley should obtain an evaluation. He should be seen by a mental
health professional of his choice—a doctor he's seeing now or perhaps
he's seen in the past—eveiy four months so we will have four reports
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during the period of the suspension. The first one will take place not later
than thirty days from the date of this hearing, with a report from Dr.
Johnson, or whoever it is, to the OPC.
f.

If there is a diagnosis or determination that Mr. Crawley has slipped into
anxiety or depression, he must bring it to the OPC's and the Court's
attention to be addressed at that point. The Court is not suggesting that the
suspension will take place, because that is not its intent, only that it be
monitored to prevent Mr. Crawley from slipping into some episode
without anybody monitoring what is happening.

g.

Mr. Crawley should commit no further violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.

h.

Within six months of the date of the sanctions hearing, Mr. Crawley
should take and pass the Multi-state Professional Responsibility
Examination.
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby
enters its Order of Discipline:
1.

Mr. Crawley shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

2.

The suspension shall be stayed, and Mr. Crawley placed on probation for a period

of 18 months under the following terms and conditions:
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a.

Mr. Crawley's conduct shall be subject to public disclosure in the
Discipline Comer that reflects the determinations that have been made,
and what the violations are.

b.

Mr. Crawley shall not engage in any litigation during that period of time,
nor enter any appearance in court.

c.

Mr. Crawley shall not advertise at all during that period of time as well.

d.

Mr. Crawley shall donate twenty-five hours of pro bono time to clients, or
Bar-related community service, either tlirough Tuesday Night Bar or some
other organization as mutually agreed upon by counsel for the parties.

e.

Mr. Crawley shall obtain an evaluation. He shall be seen by a mental
health professional of his choice—a doctor he's seeing now or perhaps
he's seen in the past—every four months. The first one shall take place
not later than thirty days from the date of the hearing, with a report from
Dr. Johnson, or whoever it is, to the OPC.

f.

If there is a diagnosis or determination that Mr. Crawley has slipped into
anxiety or depression, he shall bring it to the OPC's and the Court's
attention to be addressed at that point.

g.

Mr. Crawley shall commit no further violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.

h.

Within six months of the date of the sanctions hearing, Mr. Crawley shall
take and pass the Multi-state Professional Responsibility Examination.
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3.

At the expiration of the probationary period, Mr. Crawley shall file a petition

pursuant to Rule 25, Rules of Discipline and Disability, and the OPC will have the opportunity to
respond.
4.

Any future complaints against Mr. Crawley shall come directly to the Court's

attention without proceeding through a Screening Panel hearing.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 2006 a true and correct copy of the

foregoing was sent via prepaid first-class U.S. Postal Service to the following:

Gregory G. Skordas (#3865)
SKORDAS, CASTON, HAMILTON & HYDE
Suite 1104 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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OFFICE OF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THg?fl®^B8©NfiD«^6aS¥L

D I S T R I Q & T LAKE COW
By —
Deputy Clerk

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Discipline
of:
MARSHA M. LANG, #4995

Respondent.

RULING AND ORDER
RE: SANCTIONS
CASE NOS. 010910847
030908681
Judge Robert K. Hilder

The first phase of this bifurcated proceeding was tried to the
Court on November 17, 18 and 19, and December 14, 2004.

Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on December 20, 2004.
The' court • found that Ms. Lang had violated' several Rules -of
Professional Conduct, as follows: Rule 1.3 (diligence) as to the
Elsbury and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 1.4(b) (communication) as
to the. Elsbury, Willcut, and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 1.4(a)
(communication) as to the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule
8.1(b) (failure to respond to the office of Professional Conduct
regarding complaints) in the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters;
Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
in this case during the course of a deposition) in the Kelley
matter; and Rule 8.4(a) in all four matters, based on the findings
of other, specific, violations

of the Rules

of Professional

Conduct.
After the court entered its Findings and Conclusions, the
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court commenced the sanctions hearing on January 13, 2005, within
the thirty days required by Rule 11(f), Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and

Disability,

inadequate.

but

the

time

set

aside

for

hearing

proved

The sanctions phase was ultimately heard over several

days, concluding with the last arguments on March 22, 2005. Prior
to closing arguments, five witnesses were examined.
Professional

Conduct

was

represented

by

Kate

The Office of

A.

respondent was represented by Andrew B. Berry.

Toomey,

and

Based upon the

testimony of the witnesses during both phases of this proceeding,
the court's Findings and Conclusions, the arguments of counsel, and
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and applicable case
law, the Court now enters its following Ruling and Order imposing
sanctions against Ms. Lang as a result of the violations previously
adjudicated:
Pursuant to the Standards: M A disciplinary sanction is imposed
on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgement that the lawyer had
engaged

in professional misconduct."

Rule 2.1.

As indicated

above, in this case the determination of violations is based on
this

court's

Findings

and

acknowledgement by Ms. Lang.

Conclusions,

and

not

on

any

It is true that, during the course of

the sanctions hearing, acting through counsel, Ms. Lang generally
accepted the findings without further argument.

Nevertheless, to

the extent there was any acknowledgement, it occurred only after
the court entered adverse findings, and such acknowledgement cannot
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be

considered

in

mitigation

of

the

violations

for

sanctions

purposes.
The factors the court must consider in imposing sanctions are
set forth in Rule 3.1.

They are: (a) the duty violated; (b) the

lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by
the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or
mitigating factors.

The court believes that these factors, in the

order stated, are a useful framework

for consideration of the

appropriate sanction (s) in this case:
(a) The duty (duties) violated.
The duties violated are set forth above in summary, and in
detail in the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered December 20, 2004.

They will not be repeated in detail

here, except as necessary to explain the court's Ruling and Order
below.
(b) The lawyer's mental state, and
(c) The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct.
Three mental states (intent, knowledge, and negligence) may be
considered pursuant to the Standards, and the determination of
which applies has a significant bearing on the presumptive sanction
for the violation(s), as does the injury factor. The three mental
states are defined in the Standards as follows:
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish
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a particular result.
'"Knowledge" (or "knowing") is the conscious awareness of the
nature of the attendant circumstances of the conduct but without
the conscious

objective

or purpose to accomplish

a particular

result.
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which
failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
lawyer would exercise in the situation.
The

Standards

also

provide

definitions

for

injury

and

potential injury, as follows:
"Injury" is harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or
the profession which results from a lawyer's misconduct.

The level

of injury can range from "serious" injury to "little or no" injury;
a reference to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater
than "little or no" injury.
"Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the
legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at
the time of the

lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some

intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the
lawyer's misconduct.
The court has very carefully considered the mental state to be
ascribed to Ms. Lang for each of the adjudicated violations, and
the injury or potential injury resulting therefrom, if any. No one
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mental state applies to all occurrences under the facts of Ms.
Lang's violations.

The court first determines that, with the

exception of the two violations regarding non-responsiveness to the
OPC, none of the violations includes conduct that could fairly be
deemed intentional.

The court will now consider the mental state

and resulting injury, if any, of each violation, by complainant:
In the Elsbury matter the court cannot determine that there is
sufficient evidence to find that the initial failure to locate and
forward income verification, etc. was knowing.

It is clear;

however, that in light of the evidence, there was a substantial
risk that the result would follow from Ms. Lang's failure to
carefully investigate her files and question her staff, and it was
manifestly negligent conduct that resulted in actual injury to the
client

(the Order to Show Cause hearing regarding failure to

produce documents as ordered) as well as potential injury, had
Judge Henriod found contempt, which would probably have occurred
but for the judge's active questioning at the hearing (which
constituted an intervening factor or event).
On the other hand, Ms. Lang's abandonment of her client at the
hearing on Order to Show Cause, when she sought to deflect any
blame from herself or her office, and place it on her client, was
knowing; that is, the conduct reflected a conscious awareness of
the facts and circumstances, but the court nevertheless does not
find a conscious purpose to abandon or harm the client; therefore,
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intent

is not present.

Finally, as . to Mr. Elsbury, the court

determines that Ms. Lang negligently failed to inform him of his
options such that he could make appropriate decisions, particularly
regarding representation, and that this failure created significant
potential harm that would likely have become actual injury, but for
Judge Henriod's insistence that Ms. Lang represent Elsbury at the
hearing.
Mr.

The representation did not, in fact, substantially aid

Elsbury,

but

Ms.

Lang's

presence

helped

Judge

Henriod

understand the circumstances and fairly allocate fault for the
failure to provide documents as ordered.
Ms. Lang's violations in the Willcut matter were primarily
knowing.

Despite Ms. Lang's testimony, the court is persuaded that

she knew that
information,

she

and

failed

that

to respond to repeated

she

did

not

keep

requests for

Ms. Willcut

informed

sufficiently (with or without inquiry) to permit the client to make
informed decisions.
that

there

conflicting

is

ho

client

The unusual feature of the Willcut matter is
evidence

of

actual

instructions,

injury,

shifting

and

given

objectives,

the
and

inconsistencies in Ms. Willcut's claims regarding the underlying
facts, the court cannot determine even potential injury resulting
from Ms. Lang's omissions.
The Kelley matter, which resulted in the court's determination
that Ms. Lang's conduct during the deposition of her client was
prejudicial to the administration of justice, was clearly a knowing
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act.

Ms. Lang claimed both ignorance of the rules of conducting

depositions (based on inexperience) and misunderstanding of the
state of the law on some specific issues. That may be so, but Ms.
Lang was inescapably aware of the nature and circumstances of her
conduct, as the deposition deteriorated into an unproductive and
argumentative exercise, even if she did not consciously desire that
result at the outset. The conduct resulted in actual harm, in that
the deposition had to be taken again (part of the cost of which was
ultimately borne by Ms. Lang pursuant to court order), and actual
harm to the client (both Ms. Lang's and the opposing party), the
legal system and the profession, both of which were cast in an
unnecessarily bad light.
The Burch-Knowley matter encompasses several violations. The
failure to move the matter to a conclusion, when it could have been
accomplished months earlier but for Ms. Lang's refusal to cooperate
in providing minimal legitimate discovery to the other side, was a
knowing act, but one which did not intend the resulting delay. Ms.
Lang did intend to be obdurate, because she resented opposing
counsel's request, but that still does not evince an intent to
cause delay. Nevertheless, delay inevitably occurred, and Ms. Lang
must have known of the circumstances that led to the delay.
While Ms. Lang was engaging in conduct that created delay, she
was knowingly not responsive to her client and she did not provide
information, particularly between late November, 2001, and March,
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2002, that either informed her client of the status of the matter
or permitted

the client to make decisions

existing circumstances.
in actual
increased
insofar

injury
child

as

the

consistent with the

All of the foregoing violations resulted

to the client, primarily
support, as well as injury
opposing

counsel

was

placed

delay

in obtaining

to the profession,
in

an

impossible

situation with his client, resulting in a loss of confidence and
termination before the matter concluded, and the reputation of the
profession suffered significantly in the eyes of both parties and
also the spouse of the child's father.
In both the Willcut

and Burch-Knowley

matters, the court

further finds that the failure to respond to the OPC requests for
information and answers to complaints was intentional.

The court

recognizes that as Ms. Lang's problems multiplied, she came to
believe that responses were futile (in fact, she apparently clings
to that belief

to this

day) , but

this

conscious

belief

only

supports the finding that Ms. Lang accordingly made a conscious
decision to not respond.
Finally, the court has not addressed the inevitable findings
of violations of Rule 8.4(a), which follow from the findings of
other, more specific, misconduct.

The court believes that it is

not necessary to assign a mental state to these violations, but if
one is required, in each instance the mental state should comport
with the mental state assigned to the underlying misconduct.
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In summary, the court finds that failure to respond to the OPC
was intentional, most of the remaining violations were knowing, but
some were merely negligent, as set forth in detail above.

In all

but the Willcut matter, the violations created both actual or
potential injury, and the existence of actual injury predominates.
The court has found all three mental states, ranging from
intentional (but only for the failures to respond to the OPC which,
while important,

occurred after the underlying violations), to

negligent, but the most prevalent state is knowledge, or knowing.
The court has also found both actual and potential injury in all
but

one

matter.

Accordingly,

the

presumptive

sanction

is

suspension, and the court must now proceed to consider aggravating
and mitigating factors that may enhance or reduce the presumptive
sanction,.
(d) The existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The Office of Professional Conduct argues several instances of
aggravating conduct, and concedes some mitigation.

Ms. Lang, of

course, argues substantial mitigation, and suggests that the only
possible aggravating factor is that there are four cases at issue,
but she nevertheless argues that these four cases do not establish
a pattern of misconduct.

The court has carefully considered the

arguments of both counsel, but in the interests of brevity, the
court will address only those factors which it deems to be truly in
controversy.
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1. Aggravating factors.
The court will first address factors listed in the Standards,
in the order listed, then consider any additional factors:
- Dishonest or selfish motive.

The court is persuaded that

Ms. Lang was dishonest in her excuses proffered to Paula Willcut;
dishonest in her blaming actions directed against opposing counsel,
primarily Joseph Bean; and selfish in her candidly stated intent to
protect herself at Mr. Elsbury's expense in the hearing before
Judge Henriod.

The court does not identify any other specifically

dishonest or selfish motive or conduct.
- Pattern of misconduct.

If four cases in which violations

are found (extending over a period of four to five years) do not
constitute a pattern, the court is not sure what would be required.
More to the point, the pattern is of similar misconduct, including
failure to communicate, blaming of clients and opposing counsel,
and refusal to accept responsibility for the lawyer's own actions.
- Multiple offenses.

See the preceding paragraph.

- Obstruction of the disciplinary process, etc.
findings of non-responsiveness
Lang's

admission

that

she

The court's

in at least two cases, and Ms.

still

believes

any

response

and

cooperation with the OPC to be futile establish this factor beyond
question.
Refusal

to

acknowledge

the

wrongful

nature

of

the

misconduct, either to the client or the disciplinary authority.
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The record fully supports such refusal to acknowledge, at least
until after the court determined certain specific violations, and
even then the acknowledgements were limited.

The greater concern

for the court, as will be addressed more fully below, is that even
when Ms. Lang appears to have a will to acknowledge and address
problems

in her professional performance,

she

appears to lack

critical insight into her own conduct and the thought processes
that have created, and to some extent, justified the conduct (that
is, in Ms. Lang's mind).
- Substantial experience in the practice of law.
problematic factor.

This is a

Ms. Lang now has nineteen years of practice.

She practiced ten or eleven years before the first violation, but
it is also true that Ms. Lang had very limited experience (at least
in 1997) in the areas of practice, and in the specific practice
activities, involved in the violations.

By 2001; however, when

several

Lang's

relevant

events

occurred,

Ms.

experience

was

considerably greater, and she had focused exclusively (as she still
does) in family law, and she should be held to the standard of an
experienced family law practitioner with respect to at least the
Burch-Knowley and Paula Willcut matters.
- The foregoing are factors drawn from the Standards, but the
court finds that the most troubling aggravating
Lang's

manifest

inability

to

understand

some

fundamental issues involved in her misconduct.

factor is Ms.
of

the

more

As will appear in
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the mitigation section, below, the court notes and commends Ms.
Lang for systemic changes that will undoubtedly prevent recurrence
of some of the violations, but those violations that arise from
lack of understanding of the advocate's role, a professional's duty
to put the client's interests above her own, and the professional
obligation to be candid and courteous with opposing counsel (and
not engage in dishonest or otherwise improper blaming behavior) are
troubling

characteristics

that

will

need

more

than

systemic

remedies.
2. The existence of mitigating circumstances.
- Absence of a prior record of discipline.

There is no prior

record, but this factor cannot be given great weight, because (1)
Ms. Lang's practice in family law was relatively new when the first
instance occurred,
violations,
filings.

and

(2) even this case, involving multiple

is a consolidation

of two separate

District Court

Accordingly, had the actions remained separate, at least

the violations in the later filing would have been preceded by an
earlier record of discipline.
- Inexperience in the practice of law.

This factor probably

applies fairly to the Kelley matter, and to a lesser extent to the
Elsbury matter, but not to the later violations.

The court also

notes that the inexperience

in the Kelley

of opposing

counsel

deposition, and her sometimes provocative conduct, are factors that
the

court

weighs

in considering

any

sanction

related
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to that

matter.
- Unreasonable delay in proceedings.

The court only addresses

this factor because it was urged by Ms. Lang's counsel throughout
the proceedings.

Delay can only refer to the Kelley matter, and

the court finds that all proceedings were timely initiated and no
prejudice resulted to Ms. Lang from the fact that the matter was
not ultimately adjudicated until more than seven years after the
deposition.

First, the initial delay resulted from Ms. Kelley' s

reasonable decision to delay a disciplinary complaint until the
underlying litigation was concluded.

Second, the OPC acted with

reasonable speed and within all time limits imposed by statute and
rule. Third, ultimate disposition was significantly delayed by Ms.
Lang's

own

actions,

including

self-representation,

discovery, and consolidation of cases at her request.

dilatory

Finally, the

sole factual predicate was conduct during one deposition in 1997.
All parties and the court had benefit of the transcript as a full
record, and all attorneys present at the deposition (Ms. Lang, her
associate, Ms. Hayes, and Ms. Kelley) testified in court, and each
had a clear recollection of the incident; therefore, no prejudice
was shown.
- Interim reform.

As is alluded to above, Ms. Lang has made

substantial, and apparently effective, systemic changes.
changes include a message response

Those

and documentation protocol,

improved calendaring, and specific procedures regarding withdrawal
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as counsel. These steps are genuine and commendable, and the court
determines that it is unlikely that most of the communication or
withdrawal of counsel problems will recur.

The court makes this

statement mindful of the testimony of David Lee, because even Mr.
Lee, who is unapologetically adverse

to Ms. Lang, conceded that

she responded to all messages by at least the second request.

In

addition, Ms. Lang's billing records and her file in the Lee matter
confirmed

that messages were carefully

documented

and promptly

returned.
In addition to systemic changes, Ms. Lang has attended the OPC
ethics

school,

regarding

and

deposition

also

attended

practice,

but

continuing
as

legal

addressed

in

education
the

next

paragraph, it appears to this court that not all lessons were well
learned.
- Imposition of other penalties or sanctions.

Ms. Lang was

sanctioned by the trial judge for her conduct in the Kelley matter,
and that sanction should have acted as a caution regarding conduct
in future depositions.

After

reviewing

the much more recent

Marlise Smith deposition

(July 21, 2004), the court is persuaded

that some improvement has occurred, but viewed as a whole, the
Janaka deposition (at issue in the Kelley matter) and the Marlise
Smith deposition show a continuing failure on Ms. Lang's part to
understand both the rules of defending a deposition, and perhaps
even more importantly, the rules and expectations of professional
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civility.

It appears that the trial court sanctions in the Kelley

matter taught a very narrow lesson, at best.
- Remorse.

Ms. Lang points to her remorse, but her counsel

had to concede that remorse delayed until trial is not a legitimate
factor

in mitigation, and that

is the only

remorse the court

observed.
SUMMARY AND ORDER
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
addressed above, the court determines that there is no basis for a
lesser sanction than the suspension presumed by the Standards.

On

the other hand, based on the aggravating factors, and the court's
specific concern that beyond systemic adjustments, Ms. Lang appears
unlikely to address the core, underlying professional failings that
brought

her

to this point, disbarment might be

appropriate.

justified

and

In fact, as the court has wrestled with its options,

the recurring question is just what sanction might give Ms. Lang
the best possible chance to make fundamental changes that could
substantially
retirement

improve

without

her

being

prospects
plagued

by

of

practicing

continuing

law

until

allegations

of

professional misconduct?
The OPC argues for a suspension of at least six months and one
day, but the preferred sanction is a one year suspension.

As

already indicated, this court does not believe that the presumption
of suspension

is overcome

in this case in any way that would
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justify the lesser sanctions urged by Ms. Lang.

Accordingly, the

sanction must include suspension, but the court firmly believes
that a suspension of six months, or even one year, without a more
proactive

component,

will

do

anything

professional conduct in the long term.

to

change

Ms.

Lang's

There must be a term of

actual suspension to bring home the seriousness of this lawyer's
misconduct, but the court determines that there must also be a
period of supervised practice to give Ms. Lang a chance to see how
family law can and should be practiced at the highest levels of
professional responsibility, with due regard for clients, other
counsel, and the courts.
With the foregoing in mind, and consistent with the Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, as addressed in detail herein, the
court now makes and enters its following:
ORDER, suspending respondent Marsha M. Lang from the practice
of law

in the

State

of

Utah

for

a period

of

twelve months,

effective May 15, 2005 (to allow winding up, pursuant to Rule 26,
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability) . The court is, at this
time, imposing the entire twelve months' suspension, but Ms. Lang
is hereby granted leave to petition the court to stay all but three
months of the suspension, on the following conditions: That Ms.
Lang, at her expense, retain an experienced member of the Utah
State

Bar,

who

is

generally

experienced

in

litigation,

and

specifically experienced in family law, to act as supervisor and
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mentor for a period of up to nine months.

The supervision shall

include one-on-one counseling regarding practice matters, review of
files, participation in court and discovery procedures, review of
documents

prepared

by

Ms.

Lang,

including

specifically

correspondence to opposing counsel, and review of all aspects of
Ms. Lang's practice.

It is anticipated that the lawyer selected

(who must be approved by this court1) shall spend approximately
four hours per week with Ms. Lang (as an average), for up to nine
months, but the specific time shall ultimately be at the discretion
of the supervising lawyer, and at a rate of compensation to be
agreed between Ms. Lang and the lawyer. If Ms. Lang chooses not to
petition for a stay, she shall serve the full suspension.
At the end of the suspension period, Ms. Lang may petition for
reinstatement pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and
Disability.
The court intends that this Ruling and Order shall be the
final Order of the court, but either the OPC or Ms. Lang may
request the court for any modification or clarification that either
may think necessary to comply with all applicable Rules or to

1

The court will stringently consider the qualifications of any prospective supervising lawyer.
If Ms. Lang washes, the court is willing to provide a list of possible candidates. These names will
not be persons the court has contacted, but merely experienced family law7 practitioners in whom the
court reposes confidence based on experience.
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effect the court's purpose as set forth herein.
Dated this 29th day of March, 2005.
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Kate A. Toomey, #6446
Deputy Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)531-9110
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

'
]I
)
I
>
)
i

Marsha M. Lang, #4995
Respondent.

ORDER STAYING THE
RESPONDENT'S SUSPENSION
AND CONCERNING THE
RESPONDENT'S REINSTATEME
TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW
UPON TERMINATION OF THE
PERIOD OF SUSPENSION

i

Civil No. 010910847

>

Judge Robert K. Hilder

The matter of the Respondent's Verified Petition for Stay of Suspension
and Imposition of Supervised Practice came on for hearing before the Court on
July 26, 2005. The Respondent, Marsha M. Lang, was present and represented
by Andrew Berry; the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC")
was represented by Kate A. Toomey.

The Court having read the Verified

Petition, the response filed by the OPC, and the Reply to the OPC's Response to
Petition for Stay and Supervised Practice submitted by Ms. Lang, and being fully
advised in the premises, does hereby enter its ORDER:
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1.

The effective date of Ms. Lang's twelve-month suspension is May

1,2005.
2.

The Court hereby stays nine months of Ms. Lang's twelve-month

suspension, commencing August 1, 2005, upon the following conditions:
a.

During the nine-month period, Ms. Lang shall at her own

expense retain Gary Howe to act as Ms. Lang's supervisor and mentor.
b.

The

supervision

shall

include

one-on-one counseling

regarding practice matters, review of files, participation in court and
discovery procedures, review of documents prepared by Ms. Lang,
including specifically correspondence to opposing counsel, and review of
all aspects of Ms. Lang's practice.
c.

It is anticipated that Mr. Howe shall spend approximately

four hours per week with Ms. Lang (as an average), for nine months, but
the specific time shall ultimately be at the discretion of Mr. Howe, and at a
rate of compensation to be agreed between Ms. Lang and Mr. Howe.
3.

The O P C shall publish notice in the next Utah Bar Journal that Ms.

Lang's suspension has been stayed subject to the conditions identified above.
4.

Ms. Lang may petition for reinstatement to the practice of law

pursuant to Rule 25, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), except
that the Court hereby abates the requirement that a suspended respondent
seeking reinstatement

must pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility

Examination.
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5.

Pursuant to Rule 25(c), RLDD, Ms. Lang shall serve a copy of the

petition for reinstatement upon the OPC, and the OPC shall publish notice of the
petition in the Utah Bar Journal pursuant to the requirements of Rule 25(d),
RLDD.

The OPC shall also notify the complainants pursuant to Rule 25(d),

RLDD.
6.

Pursuant to Rule 25(f), RLDD, after receiving Ms. Lang's petition for

reinstatement, the OPC shall either advise Ms. Lang and the Court that it will
stipulate to Ms. Lang's reinstatement or file a written objection to the petition.
7.

Pursuant to Rule 25(g), RLDD, if the OPC objects to Ms. Lang's

petition for reinstatement, the Court will conduct a hearing on Ms. Lang's petition.
If the OPC files no objection, the Court will review the petition without a hearing
and enter its findings and order.
Dated this JjJi

day oU^ty^,

2005.
BY THE COURT:

^oho^^RoberiK.
'Hilder
Third Judicial District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of

, 2005, I mailed via

United States mail, first-class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER STAYING THE RESPONDENT'S SUSPENSION AND
CONCERNING THE
PRACTICE

RESPONDENT'S

OF LAW UPON

REINSTATEMENT

TERMINATION

THE

OF THE PERIOD OF

SUSPENSION to:
Andrew Berry
62 West Main Street
P.O. Box 600
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600
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Summary Chart of
State Rules Governing Probation and Stayed Suspensions
Jurisdiction

Probation

Stayed Suspension

Alabama

Rule 8(h), Alabama Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides that
probation is appropriate only in cases where there is little likelihood
that the respondent will harm the public during the period of
probation and where the conditions of probation can be adequately
supervised.

Not identified in rules as a sanction but are
ordered as "other requirements that the
Disciplinary Board deems consistent with the
purposes of lawyer discipline."

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

Rule 16(a)(3), Alaska Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, provides for
Not identified in rules as sanction
probation as a sanction.
Rule 60(a)(5)(B), Arizona Supreme Court Rules, provides that
probation may be imposed when there is little likelihood that
Not identified in rules as sanction
Respondent will harm the public during probation and conditions of
probation can be adequately supervised
Section 17.E(7), Arkansas Supreme Court Procedures of Regulating
Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law, provides that prior to or
subsequent to the filing of a formal complaint, a panel of the
Committee may place the lawyer on probation for a period not Does not stay suspensions based on compliance
exceeding two years. Probation shall be used only in cases where with conditions
there is little likelihood the lawyer will harm the public during the
period of rehabilitation and the conditions of probation can be
adequately supervised.
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California

General Standard 1.5(e), California Standards for Attorney Sanctions
for Professional Misconduct, addition of reasonable conditions, such
as supervision by a probation monitor may be reasonable and
appropriate in assessing compliance with any duties or conditions
imposed

General Standard 1.4(c)(1), California Standards
for
Attorney
Sanctions
of
Professional
Misconduct, provides that an execution of a
suspension may be stayed for a period of one to
five years only if the stay and the performance of
specified duties by the respondent are consistent
with Standard 1.3, regarding protection of the
public, courts, legal profession maintenance ofl
high legal standards, etc.

Colorado

Rule 251.7, Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that an
attorney may be placed on probation if they can demonstrate that
they are unlikely to harm the public during the probationary period,
can be adequately supervised, are able to practice law without
causing the courts and the profession to fall into disrepute, and have
not committed acts warranting disbarment.

Rule 251.7 allows probation to be imposed in
conjunction with a suspension, which may be
stayed in whole or in part (pursuant to Rule
251.6(b))

Connecticut

Delaware
District of Colombia

Florida

Georgia

Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can]
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can and has been
and has been ordered by the Court, in its
ordered by the Court, in its discretion to fashion whatever discipline
discretion
to
fashion
whatever
discipline
necessary to protect the public
necessary to protect the public
Rule 20, Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure,
Not identified in rules as sanction
provides for probation as a sanction.
Rule XI, Section 3(a)(7), Rules Governing the District of Columbia
Bar, may not be for more than three years. Imposed in lieu of or in Not identified in rules as sanction
addition to other sanctions.
Rule 3-5.1(c), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Respondent may be
placed on probation for a period not less than 6 months nor more
than three years or for an indefinite period determined by conditions
Not identified in rules as sanction
stated in the order. Conditions may include but are not limited to:
completion of a practice and professionalism enhancement program,
supervision by a member of the Florida Bar, etc.
Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction
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Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Rule 506(c)), Idaho Bar Commission Rules, only imposed in cases
where there is little likelihood that the defendant will harm the public
during the probation and the probation can be adequately!
supervised.
Rule 772, Illinois Supreme Court Rule, imposed only in cases where
the attorney has demonstrated that he is unlikely to harm the public
during the period of rehabilitation and the necessary conditions of
probation can be adequately supervised. Attorney cannot have
committed acts which warrant disbarment
Rule 23 Section 3(c), Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and the
Discipline of Attorneys, in cases of misconduct or disability, the Court
may, in lieu of disbarment or suspension place an attorney on
probation and permit the attorney to continue practicing law if in its
opinion such action is appropriate and desirable. The attorney will be
subject to the conditions and limitations as the Court sees fit to
impose and upon violation of such conditions the attorney may be
suspended or disbarred.

Rule 507(a)(1), Idaho Bar Commission Rules,
provides that suspensions may be withheld in
whole or in part, contingent upon the defendant's
observance of specified conditions

Not identified in rules as sanction

No identified in rules as sanction but it appears
that Rule 23 Section 3(c) allows the Court to
"stay" a suspension and place the attorney on
probation. If the attorney violates the conditions
of probation they may be suspended.

Rule 34.13, Rules of Procedure of the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board, provides for a deferral of "further proceedings
pending the attorney's compliance with conditions imposed by the Not identified in rules as sanction
board for supervision of the attorney for a specified period of time not
to exceed one year unless extended by the board

Not identified in the rules as a sanction; however, Rule 203, Kansas
Supreme Court Rules, Subsection (a)(5) provides for any form of
discipline or conditions separate from or connected to any other
discipline that the Supreme Court deems appropriate

Not identified in the rules as a sanction; however,
Rule 203, Kansas Supreme Court Rules,
Subsection (a)(5) provides for any form of]
discipline or conditions separate from or
connected to any other discipline that the
[Supreme Court deems appropriate
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Kentucky

Louisiana

Rule 3.380, Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, does not
specifically provide for probations but rather public reprimands
Not identified in rules as sanction
and/or suspensions with conditions. The "with conditions" clause
has been used to probate sanctions.
Rule XIX, Section 10(A)(3), Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, probation should be used only in cases where there is
Not identified in rules as a sanction, they have
little likelihood that the respondent will harm the public during the
developed jurisprudential^
period of rehabi itation and the conditions of probation can be
adequately supervised

Maine

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Maryland

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Massachusetts

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Rule 9.121(C), Michigan Court Rules, provides for probation when
during the subject period the attorney was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol and the impairment caused or substantially
contributed to the conduct. Probation must not be contrary to the
public interest and cannot exceed two years.

Rule 9.106 Michigan Court Rules allows
reprimands or suspensions with conditions as the
hearing panel, the board, or the Supreme Court
may impose. In practice panels are more likely to
issue a reprimand with conditions than probation.

Michigan

Minnesota

Rule 15(a)(4), Minnesota Rules on Lawyers Professional
Responsibility, upon conclusion of the proceedings the Court may Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the
place the lawyer on probationary status for a stated period or until Court routinely imposes stayed suspensions, and
further order of the Court, with such conditions as the Court may even imposed one stayed disbarment.
specify and to be supervised by the Director.

Mississippi

provides for suspensions with or without probation for a fixed period Not identified in rules as sanction

KUIS

y(Dj(iii), Kuies or Discipline tor tne Mississippi biaie oarj

nf time)

Missouri

.

Rule 5.225(a), Missouri Rules Governing the Missouri Bar and the
Judiciary, lawyer is eligible for probation if he or she is unlikely to Rule 5.225(a), Missouri Rules Governing the
harm the public during the period of probation and can be adequately Missouri Bar and the Judiciary, Probation
supervised; lawyer must be able to practice law w/o causing courtsi provides that probations must be imposed in
or profession to fall into disrepute; and cannot have committed an act conjunction with suspension that may be stayed
warranting disbarment. Must be imposed for a specified period of^ in whole or in part
time and in conjunctionDigitized
with a by
suspension
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Montana
Nebraska

Nevada

Rule 9(C), Montana Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement,
allows lawyer to be placed on probation for such time and conditions Not identified in rules as sanction
as are determined to be appropriate.
Rule 4(A)(3), Nebraska Disciplinary Rules, provides for probation in
Not identified in rules as sanction
lieu of or subsequent to a suspension.
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but are routinely imposed by Not identified in the rules as a sanction but are
agreement and/or contested hearing and are upheld by the Supreme routinely imposed by agreement and/or contested
hearing and are upheld by the Supreme Court
Court

New Hampshire

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

New Jersey

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

New Mexico

Rule 17-206(B), New Mexico Rules Governing Discipline, if the
record discloses that the respondent can still perform legal services
with proper supervision the Supreme Court may impose probation or
other conditions as a type of discipline by itself or may defer the
effect of the sanctions specified in subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, or 4
(regarding disbarment, suspension, indefinite suspension, or public
censure).

Rule 17-206(B), New Mexico Rules Governing
Discipline, provides that the Supreme Court may
defer the
effect
of sanctions, including
suspensions.

New York

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

North Carolina

Not identified in rules as sanction

General Statutes of North Carolina section 8428(c)(2) allows for suspension for a period of up
to five years, any portion of which may be stayed.

North Dakota

Ohio

r\uiu *+.^aj, IMUIui udivuid r\uies IUI Ldwyui uisupmie, piuviues IUI
probation in cases where there is little likelihood that the attorney will Not identified in rules as sanction
harm the public during the supervised period and the conditions of
Rule V, Section 6.(B)(4), Rules for the Government of the Bar of
Rule V. Section 6. (B)(3) Suspension from the
Ohio, probation for a period of time upon conditions as the Supreme
practice of law for a period of six months to two
Court determines, but only in conjunction with a suspension pursuant
years subject to a stay in whole or in part
to division (B)(3) of this section.
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Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can and has been
and has been ordered by the Court, in its
ordered by the Court, in its discretion to fashion whatever discipline
discretion
to
fashion
whatever
discipline
necessary to protect the public
necessary to protect the public
Rule 6.1(a)(v), Oregon State Bar Rules ofl
Rule 6.2(a), Oregon State Bar Rules of Procedure, upon
Procedure, a suspension for any period in BR
determination that an attorney should be suspended the trial panel
6.1(a)(iii) or 6.1(a)(iv) which may be stayed in
may stay the suspension in whole or in part and place the attorney
whole or in part on the condition that designated
on probation for a period no longer than three years.
probationary terms are met
Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Subchapter G
section 89.291 repsondent attorney may be placed on probation if
they have demonstrated that they can perform legal services and will
not cause the legal profession to fall into disrepute; are unlikely to Not identified in rules as sanction
cause harm to the public during the period of probation; the
necessary conditions of probation can be adequately supervised;
and are not guilty of acts warranting disbarment.
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the Court can and does
Court can and does enter disciplinary orders
enter disciplinary orders imposing conditions that are tantamount to
imposing conditions that are tantamount to
probation
stayed suspensions
Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction
i

South Dakota

Tennessee

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

Rule 9 Section 8.5, Tennessee Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement,
the imposition of a suspension may be suspended in conjunction
with a fixed period of probation. Probation shall be used only in
cases where there is little likelihood that the respondent will harm the
public during the probationary period and where the conditions of
probation can be adequately supervised

Rule 9 Section 8.5, Tennessee Rules ofl
Disciplinary Enforcement, indicates that a
suspension may be stayed in conjunction with
fixed period of probation.
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Texas

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia
Wisconsin

1

Wyoming

Rule 15.11, Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides that
fully probated suspensions shall not be used in cases where the
respondent received a public reprimand or a fully probated
suspension within the last five years for violation of the same
rule/rules; the respondent received two or more fully probated
suspensions within the last five years; or the respondent received
two or more public reprimands or greater within the last five years for
conflict of interest, theft, misapplication of fiduciary property, or the
failure to return a clearly unearned fee.
Administrative Order 9, Rule 8(A)(6), Vermont Supreme Court
Administrative Orders and Rules, Probation may be imposed only in
conjunction with another sanction, reinstatement from disability,
reinstatement from disbarment, or suspension. Shall be used only in
cases where there is little likelihood that the respondent will harm the
public during the probation and the conditions of probation can be
adequately supervised.
Not identified in rules as sanction

2.25 and 3.14, Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure, allow for stayed suspensions.
Disbarments may not be stayed.

Not identified in rules as sanction

Not identified in rules as sanction

ELC 13.8, Washington Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Discipline, a
respondent who has been sanctioned under 13.1 (disbarred,
Not identified in rules as sanction
suspended, or reprimanded) or admonished under 13.5(b) may be
placed on probation for a fixed period of two years or less.
Rule 3.15(1), West Virginia Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides
for probation.
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, although the Court
occasionally imposes "conditions on continued practice."
Not identified in rules as sanction except as may be appropriate
under the terms of a diversion contract pursuant to Section 14,
Wyoming Disciplinary Code

Not identified in rules as sanction
Not identified in rules as sanction
Stayed suspension cannot be longer than five
years pursuant to Section 4(a)(ii), Wyoming
Disciplinary Code
______]

This chart was prepared in August 2006 based upon information provided to the OPC by its counterparts in other states.
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